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Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health and Human Services 
No. 12-15 
Ruling Below: Massachusetts v. Us. Dept. of Health & H1lman Services, 682 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 
2012),petitionfor cert.fzled, 2012 WL 2586937 (U.S. 2012). 
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defines the term "marriage" for all purposes 
under federal law as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife." 
It also defines "spouse" as "a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." In Gill v. 
Office of Personnel Management, seven homosexual couples and three surviving spouses 
married in Massachusetts sued to enjoin agencies and officials from enforcing DOMA and 
denying them federal benefits that were otherwise available to heterosexual couples. In 
Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health and H1Iman Services, Massachusetts 
brought a companion case out of concern for losing federal funding for programs such as 
Medicaid and veterans' cemeteries. With opinions released on the same day, District Court Judge 
Tauro held that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, and it 
violated the Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment. These cases were joined on appeal to the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed the district court's decision that DOMA 
was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds while rejecting the Spending Clause and Tenth 
Amendment rationales. 
Question Presented: Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.c. 7, violates 
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the 
same sex who are legally married under the laws of their state. 
Commonwealth of MASSACHUSETTS, Plaintiff, Appellee, 
v. 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et aI., 
Defendants, Appellants. 
Dean Hara, Plaintiff, Appellee/Cross-Appellant; Nancy Gill, et aI., Plaintiffs, Appellees; 
Keith Toney, et aI., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Office of Personnel Management, et aI., Defendants, Appellants/Cross-Appellees; Hillary 
Rodham Clinton, in her official capacity as United States Secretary of State, Defendant. 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
Decided May 31, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. These appeals present constitutional 
challenges to section 3 of the Defense of 
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Marriage Act ("DOMA"), 1 U.S.c. § 7, 
which denies federal economic and other 
benefits to same-sex couples lawfully 
married in Massachusetts and to surviving 
spouses from couples thus married. Rather 
than challenging the right of states to define 
marriage as they see fit, the appeals contest 
the right of Congress to undercut the choices 
made by same-sex couples and by individual 
states in deciding who can be married to 
whom. 
In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that 
it might violate the Hawaii constitution to 
deny marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 
Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530 (1993). 
Although Hawaii then empowered its 
legislature to block such a ruling, Haw. 
Const. art. I, § 23-which it did, Act of June 
22, 1994, 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 526 (H.B. 
2312) (codified at Haw.Rev.Stat. § 572-
1 )-the Hawaii decision was followed by 
legalization of same-sex marriage in a small 
minority of states, some by statute and a few 
by judicial decision; many more states 
responded by banning same-sex marriage by 
statute or constitutional amendment. 
Congress reacted with the same alarm as 
many state legislatures. Within three years 
after the Hawaii decision, DOMA was 
enacted with strong majorities in both 
Houses and signed into law by President 
Clinton. The entire statute, reprinted in an 
addendum to this decision, must-having 
only two operative paragraphs-be one of 
the shortest major enactments in recent 
history. Section 3 of DOMA, 1 U.S.c. § 7, 
defines "marriage" for purposes of federal 
law: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of 
Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative 
bureaus and agencies of the United States, 
the word "marriage" means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word "spouse" 
refers only to a person of the opposite sex 
who is a husband or a wife. 
Section 2, which is not at issue here, 
absolves states from recognizing same-sex 
marriages solemnized in other states. 
DOMA does not formally invalidate same-
sex marriages in states that permit them, but 
its adverse consequences for such a choice 
are considerable. Notably, it prevents same-
sex married couples from filing joint federal 
tax returns, which can lessen tax burdens, 
see 26 U.S.C. § 1 (a)-(c), and prevents the 
surviving spouse of a same-sex marriage 
from collecting Social Security survivor 
benefits, e.g., 42 U.S.c. § 402(f), (i). 
DOMA also leaves federal employees 
unable to share their health insurance and 
certain other medical benefits with same-sex 
spouses. 
DOMA affects a thousand or more generic 
cross-references to marriage in myriad 
federal laws. In most cases, the changes 
operate to the disadvantage of same-sex 
married couples in the half dozen or so 
states that permit same-sex marriage. The 
number of couples thus affected is estimated 
at more than 100,000. Further, DOMA has 
potentially serious adverse consequences, 
hereafter described, for states that choose to 
legalize same-sex marriage. 
In Gill v. OPM, No. 10-2207, seven same-
sex couples married in Massachusetts and 
three surviving spouses of such marriages 
brought suit in federal district court to enjoin 
pertinent federal agencies and officials from 
enforcing DOMA to deprive the couples of 
federal benefits available to opposite-sex 
married couples in Massachusetts. The 
Commonwealth brought a companion case, 
Massach1lsetts v. DHHS, No. 10-2204, 
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concerned that DOMA will revoke federal 
funding for programs tied to DOMA's 
opposite-sex marriage definition-such as 
Massachusetts' state Medicaid program and 
veterans' cemeteries. 
By combining the income of individuals in 
same-sex marriages, Massachusetts' 
Medicaid program is noncompliant with 
DOMA, and the Department of Health and 
Human Services, through its Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, has 
discretion to rescind Medicaid funding to 
noncomplying states. Burying a veteran with 
his or her same-sex spouse removes federal 
"veterans' cemetery" status and gives the 
Department of Veterans' Affairs discretion 
to recapture all federal funding for the 
cemetery. 
The Department of Justice defended DOMA 
in the district court but, on July 8, 2010, that 
court found section 3 unconstitutional under 
the Equal Protection Clause. Gill v. Office of 
Pers. Mgmt., 699 F.Supp.2d 374, 397 
(D.Mass.2010). In the companion case, the 
district court accepted the Commonwealth's 
argument that section 3 violated the 
Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment. 
Massachusetts v. u.s. Dep't of Health & 
Human Sen!s., 698 F.Supp.2d 234, 249, 253 
(D. Mass.20 10). 
The district court's judgment declared 
section 3 unconstitutional and enjoined the 
federal officials and agencies from enforcing 
section 3, but the court stayed injunctive 
relief pending appeals. The judgment 
included specific remedies ordered for the 
named plaintiffs in relation to tax, social 
security and like claims. With one 
qualification--discussed separately below-
the federal defendants have throughout 
focused solely upon the district court's 
premise that DOMA is unconstitutional. 
The Justice Department filed a brief in this 
court defending DOMA against all 
constitutional claims. Thereafter, altering its 
position, the Justice Department filed a 
revised brief arguing that the equal 
protection claim should be assessed under a 
"heightened scrutiny" standard and that 
DOMA failed under that standard. It 
opposed the separate Spending Clause and 
Tenth Amendment claims pressed by the 
Commonwealth. The Gill plaintiffs defend 
the district court judgment on all three 
grounds. 
A delay in proceedings followed the Justice 
Department's about face while defense of 
the statute passed to a group of Republican 
leaders of the House of Representatives-
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group ("the 
Legal Group")-who retained counsel and 
intervened in the appeal to support section 3. 
A large number of amicus briefs have been 
filed on both sides of the dispute, some on 
both sides proving very helpful to the court. 
On appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment, our review is de novo, Kuperman 
v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir.2011), 
and the issues presented are themselves legal 
in character, even though informed by 
background information as to legislative 
purpose and "legislative facts" bearing upon 
the rationality or adequacy of distinctions 
drawn by statutes. E.g., FCC v. Beach 
Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-20 
(1993). Such information is normally 
noticed by courts with the assistance of 
briefs, records and common knowledge. 
Daggett v. Comm 'n on Governmental Ethics 
& Election Practices, 172 F .3d 104, 112 (l st 
Cir.1999). 
This case is difficult because it couples 
issues of equal protection and federalism 
with the need to assess the rationale for a 
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congressional statute passed with minimal 
hearings and lacking in formal findings. In 
addition, Supreme COUli precedent offers 
some help to each side, but the rationale in 
several cases is open to interpretation. We 
have done our best to discern the direction 
of these precedents, but only the Supreme 
Court can finally decide this unique case. 
Although our decision discusses equal 
protection and federalism concerns 
separately, it concludes that governing 
precedents under both heads combine-not 
to create some new category of "heightened 
scrutiny" for DOMA under a prescribed 
algorithm, but rather to require a closer than 
usual review based in pati on discrepant 
impact among married couples and in part 
on the importance of state interests in 
regulating marriage. Our decision then tests 
the rationales offered for DOMA, taking 
account of Supreme Court precedent 
limiting which rationales can be counted and 
of the force of celiain rationales. 
Eqllal Protection. The Legal Group says that 
any equal protection challenge to DOMA is 
foreclosed at the outset by Baker v. Nelson, 
409 U.S. 810 (1972). There, a central claim 
made was that a state's refusal to recognize 
same-sex marriage violated federal equal 
protection principles. Minnesota had, like 
DOMA, defined marriage as a union of 
persons of the opposite sex, and the state 
supreme court had upheld the statute. On 
appeal, the Supreme COUli dismissed 
summarily for want of a substantial federal 
question. ld. 
Baker is precedent binding on us unless 
repudiated by subsequent Supreme COUli 
precedent. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 
344 (1975). Following Baker, "gay rights" 
claims prevailed in several well known 
decisions, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996), but neither mandates that the 
Constitution requires states to permit same-
sex marriages. A Supreme Court summary 
dismissal "prevent[ s] lower courts from 
coming to opposite conclusions on the 
precise issues presented and necessarily 
decided by those actions." Mandel v. 
Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per 
curiam). Baker does not resolve our own 
case but it does limit the arguments to ones 
that do not presume or rest on a 
constitutional right to same-sex marriage. 
Central to this appeal is Supreme Court case 
law governing equal protection analysis. The 
Gill plaintiffs say that DOMA fails under 
the so-called rational basis test, traditionally 
used in cases not involving "suspect" 
classifications. The federal defendants said 
that DOMA would survive such rational 
basis scrutiny but now urge, instead, that 
DOMA fails under so-called intermediate 
scrutiny. In our view, these competing 
formulas are inadequate fully to describe 
governing precedent. 
Certain suspect classifications-race, 
alienage and national origin-require what 
the Court calls strict scrutiny, which entails 
both a compelling governmental interest and 
narrow tailoring. Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Gender-
based classifications invoke intermediate 
scrutiny and must be substantially related to 
achieving an impOliant governmental 
objective.s Both are far more demanding 
than rational basis review as conventionally 
applied in routine matters of commercial, 
tax and like regulation. 
Equal protection claims tested by this 
rational basis standard, famously called by 
Justice Holmes the "last resort of 
constitutional argument," Blick v. Bell, 274 
U.S. 200,208 (1927), rarely succeed. Courts 
accept as adequate any plausible factual 
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basis, Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 
(l955), without regard to Congress' actual 
motives. Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 314. 
Means need not be narrowly drawn to 
meet-or even be entirely consistent with-
the stated legislative ends. Lee Optical, 348 
U.S. at 487-88. 
Under such a rational basis standard, the Gill 
plaintiffs cannot prevail. Consider only one 
of the several justifications for DOMA 
offered by Congress itself, namely, that 
broadening the definition of marriage will 
reduce tax revenues and increase social 
security payments. This is the converse of 
the very advantages that the Gill plaintiffs 
are seeking, and Congress could rationally 
have believed that DOMA would reduce 
costs, even if newer studies of the actual 
economic effects of DOMA suggest that it 
may in fact raise costs for the federal 
government. 
The federal defendants conceded that 
rational basis review leaves DOMA intact 
but now urge this court to employ the so-
called intermediate scrutiny test used by 
Supreme Court for gender discrimination. 
Some similarity exists between the two 
situations along with some differences, 
compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 682-88 (l973) (plurality opinion). But 
extending intermediate scrutiny to sexual 
preference classifications is not a step open 
to us. 
First, this court in Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 
42 (lst Cir.2008), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 
174 L.Ed.2d 284 (2009), has already 
declined to create a major new category of 
"suspect classification" for statutes 
distinguishing based on sexual preference. 
Cook rejected an equal protection challenge 
to the now-superceded "Don't Ask, Don't 
Tell" policy adopted by Congress for the 
military, pointing out that Romer itself 
avoided the suspect classification label. 
Cook, 528 F.3d at 61-62. This binds the 
panel. San J1lan Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., 
612 FJd 25,33 (lst Cir.2010). 
Second, to create such a new suspect 
classification for same-sex relationships 
would have far-reaching implications-in 
particular, by implying an overruling of 
Baker, which we are neither empowered to 
do nor willing to predict. Nothing indicates 
that the Supreme Court is about to adopt this 
new suspect classification when it 
conspicuously failed to do so in Romer-a 
case that could readily have been disposed 
by such a demarche. That such a 
classification could overturn marriage laws 
in a huge majority of individual states 
underscores the implications. 
However, that is not the end of the matter. 
Without relying on suspect classifications, 
Supreme Court equal protection decisions 
have both intensified scrutiny of purported 
justifications where minorities are subject to 
discrepant treatment and have limited the 
permissible justifications. And (as we later 
explain), in areas where state regulation has 
traditionally governed, the Court may 
require that the federal government interest 
in intervention be shown with special 
clarity. 
In a set of equal protection decisions, the 
Supreme Court has now several times struck 
down state or local enactments without 
invoking any suspect classification. In each, 
the protesting group was historically 
disadvantaged or unpopular, and the 
statutory justification seemed thin, 
unsupported or impermissible. It is these 
decisions-not classic rational basis 
review-that the Gill plaintiffs and the 
Justice Department most usefully invoke in 
their briefs (while seeking to absorb them 
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into different and more rigid categorical 
lUbrics). 
The oldest of the decisions, u.s. Dept. of 
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), 
invalidated Congress' decision to exclude 
from the food stamp program households 
contaInIng unrelated individuals. 
Disregarding purported justifications that 
such households were more likely to 
under-report income and to evade 
detection, the Court closely sClUtinized the 
legislation's fit-finding both that the lUle 
disqualified many otherwise-eligible and 
particularly needy households, and a "bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group." Jd. at 534, 537-38. 
The second, City of Cleb1lrne v. Cleb1lrne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), overturned 
a local ordinance as applied to the denial of 
a special permit for operating a group home 
for the mentally disabled. The Court found 
unconvincing interests like protecting the 
inhabitants against the risk of flooding, 
given that nursing or convalescent homes 
were allowed without a permit; mental 
disability too had no connection to alleged 
concerns about popUlation density. All that 
remained were "mere negative attitudes, or 
fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are 
properly cognizable In a zonmg 
proceeding." Jd. at 448. 
Finally, in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996), the Court struck down a provision in 
Colorado's constitution prohibiting 
regulation to protect homosexuals from 
discrimination. The Court, calling 
"unprecedented" the "disqualification of a 
class of persons from the right to seek 
specific protection from the law," deemed 
the provision a "status-based enactment 
divorced from any factual context from 
which we could discern a relationship to 
legitimate state interests." Jd. at 632-33, 
635. 
These three decisions did not adopt some 
new category of suspect classification or 
employ rational basis review in its 
minimalist form; instead, the Court rested on 
the case-specific nature of the discrepant 
treatment, the burden imposed, and the 
infirmities of the justifications offered. 
Several Justices have remarked on this-
both favorably, City of Cleb1lrne, 473 U.S. 
at 451-55 (1985) (Stevens, 1., concurring), 
and unfavorably, United States v. Virginia 
(VMJ), 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, 1., 
dissenting). 
Circuit courts, citing these same cases, have 
similarly concluded that equal protection 
assessments are sensitive to the 
circumstances of the case and not dependent 
entirely on abstract categorizations. As one 
distinguished judge observed: 
Judges and commentators have noted 
that the usually deferential "rational 
basis" test has been applied with 
greater rigor in some contexts, 
particularly those in which courts 
have had reason to be concerned 
about possible discrimination. 
United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468 (2d 
Cir.1995) (Calabresi, 1., concurring) (citing 
City of Cleb1lrne as an example). There is 
nothing remarkable about this: categories 
are often approximations and are themselves 
constructed by weighing of underlying 
elements. 
All three of the cited cases-Moreno, City of 
Cleb1lrne and Romer-stressed the historic 
patterns of disadvantage suffered by the 
group adversely affected by the statute. As 
with the women, the poor and the mentally 
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impaired, gays and lesbians have long been 
the subject of discrimination. Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 571. The COUli has in these cases 
undetiaken a more careful assessment of the 
justifications than the light scrutiny offered 
by conventional rational basis review. 
As for burden, the combined effect of 
DOMA's restrictions on federal benefits will 
not prevent same-sex marriage where 
permitted under state law; but it will 
penalize those couples by limiting tax and 
social security benefits to opposite-sex 
couples in their own and all other states. For 
those married same-sex couples of which 
one partner is in federal service, the other 
cannot take advantage of medical care and 
other benefits available to opposite-sex 
partners in Massachusetts and everywhere 
else in the country. 
These burdens are comparable to those the 
Court found substantial in Moreno, City of 
Cleburne, and Romer. Moreno, like this 
case, involved meaningful economic 
benefits; City of Cleburne involved the 
opportunity to secure housing; Romer, the 
chance to secure equal protection of the laws 
on the same terms as other groups. Loss of 
survivor's social security, spouse-based 
medical care and tax benefits are major 
detriments on any reckoning; provision for 
retirement and medical care are, in practice, 
the main components of the social safety net 
for vast numbers of Americans. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the extreme 
deference accorded to ordinary economic 
legislation in cases like Lee Optical would 
not be extended to DOMA by the Supreme 
Court; and without insisting on 
"compelling" or "impoliant" justifications or 
"narrow tailoring," the Court would 
scrutinize with care the purported bases for 
the legislation. Before providing such 
scrutiny, a separate element absent in 
Moreno, City of Cleburne, and Romer-
federalism-must be considered. 
Federalism. In assailing DOMA, the 
plaintiffs and especially the Commonwealth 
rely directly on limitations attributed to the 
Spending Clause of the Constitution and the 
Tenth Amendment; the Justice Department, 
along with the Legal Group, rejects those 
claims. In our view, neither the Tenth 
Amendment nor the Spending Clause 
invalidates DOMA; but Supreme COUli 
precedent relating to federalism-based 
challenges to federal laws reinforce the need 
for closer than usual scrutiny of DOMA's 
justifications and diminish somewhat the 
deference ordinarily accorded. 
It is true that DOMA intrudes extensively 
into a realm that has from the start of the 
nation been primarily confided to state 
regulation-domestic relations and the 
definition and incidents of lawful 
marriage-which is a leading instance of the 
states' exercise of their broad police-power 
authority over morality and culture. As the 
Supreme Court observed long ago, 
[t]he whole subject of the domestic 
relations of husband and wife, parent 
and child, belongs to the laws of the 
States and not to the laws of the 
United States. 
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 
(1979) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 
593-94 (1890)); see also Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1,7 (1967)(marriage). 
Consonantly, Congress has never purported 
to lay down a general code defining 
marriage or purporting to bind the states to 
such a regime. Rather, in individual 
situations-such as the anti-fraud criteria in 
immigration law, 8 U.S.C. § 
1 186a(b )(1 )(A)(i)-Congress has provided 
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its own definitions limited to the particular 
program or personnel involved. But no 
precedent exists for DOMA's sweeping 
general "federal" definition of marriage for 
all federal statutes and programs. 
Nevertheless, Congress surely has an 
interest in who counts as married. The 
statutes and programs that section 3 governs 
are federal regimes such as social security, 
the Internal Revenue Code and medical 
insurance for federal workers; and their 
benefit structure requires deciding who is 
married to whom. That Congress has 
traditionally looked to state law to determine 
the answer does not mean that the Tenth 
Amendment or Spending Clause require it to 
do so. 
Supreme Court interpretations of the Tenth 
Amendment have varied over the years but 
those in force today have struck down 
statutes only where Congress sought to 
commandeer state governments or otherwise 
directly dictate the internal operations of 
state government. Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
Whatever its spin-off effects, section 3 
governs only federal programs and funding, 
and does not share these two vices of 
commandeering or direct command. 
Neither does DOMA run afoul of the 
"germaneness" requirement that conditions 
on federal funds must be related to federal 
purposes. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 
203, 207-08 (1987). The requirement is not 
implicated where, as here, Congress merely 
defines the telms of the federal benefit. In 
Dole, the Supreme COUli upheld a condition 
by which federal funds for highway 
construction depended on a state's adoption 
of a minimum drinking age for all driving on 
state roadways. 483 U.S. at 205. DOMA 
merely limits the use of federal funds to 
prescribed purposes. 
However, the denial of federal benefits to 
same-sex couples lawfully married does 
burden the choice of states like 
Massachusetts to regulate the rules and 
incidents of marriage; notably, the 
Commonwealth stands both to assume new 
administrative burdens and to lose funding 
for Medicaid or veterans' cemeteries solely 
on account of its same-sex marriage laws. 
These consequences do not violate the Tenth 
Amendment or Spending Clause, but 
Congress' effort to put a thumb on the scales 
and influence a state's decision as to how to 
shape its own marriage laws does bear on 
how the justifications are assessed. 
In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995), the Supreme Court scrutinized 
with special care federal statutes intruding 
on matters customarily within state control. 
The lack of adequate and persuasive 
findings led the Court in both cases to 
invalidate the statutes under the Commerce 
Clause even though nothing more than 
rational basis review is normally afforded in 
such cases. 
The Supreme Comi has made somewhat 
similar statements about the need for 
scrutiny when examining federal statutes 
intruding on regulation of state election 
processes. Nw. A1lstin Mun. Uti!. Dist. No. 
One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009); cf City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 
( 1997) (calling RFRA a "considerable 
congressional intrusion into the States' 
traditional prerogatives and general 
authority to regulate for the health and 
welfare of their citizens"). 
True, these federalism cases examined the 
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reach of federal power under the Commerce 
Clause and other sources of constitutional 
authority not invoked here; but a statute that 
violates equal protection is likewise beyond 
the power of Congress. See Moreno, 413 
U.S. at 541, (Douglas, J., concurring). Given 
that DOMA intrudes broadly into an area of 
traditional state regulation, a closer 
examination of the justifications that would 
prevent DOMA from violating equal 
protection (and thus from exceeding federal 
authority) is uniquely reinforced by 
federalism concerns. 
DOMA's Rationales. Despite its ramifying 
application throughout the U.S. Code, only 
one day of hearings was held on DOMA, 
Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on H.R. 
3396 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 104th Congo (1996) ("Hearing"), 
and none of the testimony concerned 
DOMA's effects on the numerous federal 
programs at issue. Some of the odder 
consequences of DOMA testify to the speed 
with which it was adopted. 
The statute, only a few paragraphs in length, 
is devoid of the express prefatory findings 
commonly made in major federal laws. E.g., 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-1; 16 U.S.C. § 1531; 20 
U.S.C. § 1400; 21 U.S.C. § 801; 29 U.S.C. § 
151; id. § 1001; 42 U.S.c. § 7401. 
Accordingly, in discerning and assessing 
Congress' basis for DOMA our main resort 
is the House Committee report and, in lesser 
measure, to variations of its themes 
advanced in the briefs before us. The 
committee report stated: 
[T]he Committee briefly discusses 
four of the governmental interests 
advanced by this legislation: (l) 
defending and nmiuring the 
institution of traditional, 
heterosexual marriage; (2) defending 
traditional notions of morality; (3) 
protecting state sovereignty and 
democratic self-governance; and (4) 
preserving 
resources. 
scarce government 
H.R.Rep. No. 104-664, at 12 (1996), 1996 
u.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2916. 
The penultimate reason listed above was not 
directed to section 3-indeed, is antithetical 
to it-but was concerned solely with section 
2, which reserved a state's power not to 
recognize same-sex marriages performed in 
other states. Thus, we begin with the others, 
reserving for separate consideration the 
claim strongly pressed by the Gill plaintiffs 
that DOMA should be condemned because 
its unacknowledged but alleged central 
motive was hostility to homosexuality. 
First, starting with the most concrete of the 
cited reasons-"preserving scarce 
government resources"-it is said that 
DOMA will save money for the federal 
government by limiting tax savings and 
avoiding social security and other payments 
to spouses. This may well be true, or at least 
might have been thought true; more detailed 
recent analysis indicates that DOMA is more 
likely on a net basis to cost the government 
money. 
But, where the distinction is drawn against a 
historically disadvantaged group and has no 
other basis, Supreme COUli precedent marks 
this as a reason undermining rather than 
bolstering the distinction. Plyler V. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202,227 (1982); Romer, 517 U.S. at 
635. The reason, derived from equal 
protection analysis, is that such a group has 
historically been less able to protect itself 
through the political process. Plyler, 457 
U.S. at 218 n. 14; United States V. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (l938). 
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A second rationale of a pragmatic character, 
advanced by the Legal Group's brief and 
several others, is to support child-rearing in 
the context of stable marriage. The evidence 
as to child rearing by same-sex couples is 
the subject of controversy, but we need not 
enter the debate. Whether or not children 
raised by opposite-sex marriages are on 
average better served, DOMA cannot 
preclude same-sex couples in Massachusetts 
from adopting children or prevent a woman 
patiner from giving birth to a child to be 
raised by both partners. 
Although the House Repoli is filled with 
encomia to heterosexual marriage, DOMA 
does not increase benefits to opposite-sex 
couples-whose marriages may in any event 
be childless, unstable or both-or explain 
how denying benefits to same-sex couples 
will reinforce heterosexual marriage. 
Certainly, the denial will not affect the 
gender choices of those seeking marriage. 
This is not merely a matter of poor fit of 
remedy to perceived problem, Lee Optical, 
348 U.S. at 487-88; City of Cleb1lrne, 473 
U.S. at 446-50, but a lack of any 
demonstrated connection between DOMA's 
treatment of same-sex couples and its 
asserted goal of strengthening the bonds and 
benefits to society of heterosexual marriage. 
A third reason, moral disapproval of 
homosexuality, lS one of DOMA's stated 
justifications: 
Civil laws that permit only 
heterosexual marriage reflect and 
honor a collective moral judgment 
about human sexuality. This 
judgment entails both moral 
disapproval of homosex1lality, and a 
moral conviction that heterosexuality 
better comports with traditional 
(especially Judeo-Christian) 
morality. 
H.R.Rep. No. 104-664, at 15-16 (emphasis 
added); see a/so, e.g., 142 Congo Rec. 
16,972 (1996) (statement of Rep. Coburn) 
(homosexuality "morally wrong"). 
For generations, moral disapproval has been 
taken as an adequate basis for legislation, 
although usually in choices made by state 
legislators to whom general police power is 
entrusted. But, speaking directly of same-
sex preferences, Lawrence ruled that moral 
disapproval alone cannot justify legislation 
discriminating on this basis. 539 U.S. at 
577-78. Moral judgments can hardly be 
avoided in legislation, but Lawrence and 
Romer have undercut this basis. Cj Palmore 
V. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,433 (1984). 
Finally, it has been suggested by the Legal 
Group's brief that, faced with a prospective 
change in state marriage laws, Congress was 
entitled to "freeze" the situation and reflect. 
But the statute was not framed as a 
temporary time-out; and it has no expiration 
date, such as one that Congress included in 
the Voting Rights Act. See Nw. A1lstin, 129 
S.Ct. at 251 0 (describing original expiration 
date and later extensions); City of Boerne, 
521 U.S. at 533. The House Report's own 
arguments-moral, prudential and fiscal-
make clear that DOMA was not framed as a 
temporary measure. 
Congress did emphasize a related concern, 
based on the Hawaii Supreme Court's 
decision in Baehr, that state judges would 
impose same-sex marriage on unwilling 
states. H.R.Rep. No. 104-664, at 5-6, 12, 
16-17. But almost all states have readily 
amended constitutions, as well as elected 
judges, and can protect themselves against 
what their citizens may regard as 
overreaching. The fear that Hawaii could 
impose same-sex marriage on sister states 
through the Full Faith and Credit Clause, id. 
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at 7-9, relates solely to section 2 of DOMA, 
which is not before us. 
We conclude, without resort to suspect 
classifications or any impairment of Baker, 
that the rationales offered do not provide 
adequate suppOli for section 3 of DOMA. 
Several of the reasons given do not match 
the statute and several others are diminished 
by specific holdings in Supreme Comi 
decisions more or less directly on point. If 
we are right in thinking that disparate impact 
on minority interests and federalism 
concerns both require somewhat more in this 
case than almost automatic deference to 
Congress' will, this statute fails that test. 
Invalidating a federal statute is an 
unwelcome responsibility for federal judges; 
the elected Congress speaks for the entire 
nation, its judgment and good faith being 
entitled to utmost respect. Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (plurality 
opinion). But a lower federal court such as 
ours must follow its best understanding of 
governing precedent, knowing that in large 
matters the Supreme Court will correct mis-
readings (and even if it approves the result 
will formulate its own explanation). 
In reaching our judgment, we do not rely 
upon the charge that DOMA's hidden but 
dominant purpose was hostility to 
homosexuality. The many legislators who 
supported DOMA acted from a variety of 
motives, one central and expressed aim 
being to preserve the heritage of marriage as 
traditionally defined over centuries of 
Western civilization. See H.R.Rep. No. 104-
664, at 12, 16. Preserving this institution is 
not the same as "mere moral disapproval of 
an excluded group," Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
585 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and that is 
singularly so in this case given the range of 
bipartisan support for the statute. 
The opponents of section 3 point to selected 
comments from a few individual legislators; 
but the motives of a small group cannot taint 
a statute supported by large majorities in 
both Houses and signed by President 
Clinton. Traditions are the glue that holds 
society together, and many of our own 
traditions rest largely on belief and 
familiarity-not on benefits firmly provable 
in court. The desire to retain them is strong 
and can be honestly held. 
For 150 years, this desire to maintain 
tradition would alone have been justification 
enough for almost any statute. This judicial 
deference has a distinguished lineage, 
including such figures as Justice Holmes, 
the second Justice Harlan, and Judges 
Learned Hand and Henry Friendly. But 
Supreme Court decisions in the last fifty 
years call for closer scrutiny of government 
action touching upon minority group 
interests and of federal action in areas of 
traditional state concern. 
To conclude, many Americans believe that 
marriage is the union of a man and a 
woman, and most Americans live in states 
where that is the law today. One viliue of 
federalism is that it permits this diversity of 
governance based on local choice, but this 
applies as well to the states that have chosen 
to legalize same-sex marriage. Under current 
Supreme Court authority, Congress' denial 
of federal benefits to same-sex couples 
lawfully married in Massachusetts has not 
been adequately supported by any 
permissible federal interest. 
Hara's Health Benefits Claim. A distinct, if 
much narrower, issue is raised by Dean 
Hara, one of the Gill plaintiffs. Although the 
district court ordered the relief Hara sought 
for Social Security lump-sum death benefits, 
the district comi found that relief on his 
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second claim for health coverage required a 
further determination on a precondition that 
is the subject of a proceeding earlier brought 
by Hara and now pending in the Federal 
Circuit. Hara v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 
2009-3134 (Fed.Cir. docketed Mar. 17, 
2009). 
Hara was married under Massachusetts law 
to a now-deceased Congressman, and Hara 
has sought to be enrolled as a surviving 
spouse for health benefits under the 
Congressman's Federal Employees' Health 
Benefit Plan ("FEHBP"). For this, (1) Hara 
would have to be an eligible "annuitant" 
under the annuity statute, and (2) the 
Congressman had to have enrolled in the 
health benefit plan for "self and family," 
which he had not done. 5 U.S.C. § 8341; 5 
C.F.R. §§ 890.303(c), 890.302(a)(1). 
Acting on an application by Hara for a 
survivor annuity benefit, the Office of 
Personnel Management ("OPM") had 
previously ruled that Hara was ineligible to 
receive an annuity both because he was not a 
spouse under DOMA and because the 
Congressman had not elected such coverage. 
Such determinations as to annuities are 
reviewed exclusively by the Merit Systems 
Protection Board ("MSPB" or "Board") and 
then exclusively by the Federal Circuit. 5 
U.S.c. §§ 8347, 8341, 7703(b)(1); 28 
U.S.C. 1295(a)(9). 
On review, the Board upheld the denial of 
coverage solely because of DOMA, finding 
the failure to elect coverage not to bar 
annuitant status. Hara sought further review 
in the Federal Circuit, and that case has been 
stayed pending resolution of the DOMA 
issue in this circuit. Hara, No. 2009-3134 
(Oct. 15, 2010 order staying proceedings). 
Thus, now-as at the time the district court 
issued its judgment-a Board determination 
is in force that Hara lacks annuitant status. 
OPM has separately denied Hara's claim for 
FEHBP health enrollment because of the 
Congressman's failure to elect "self and 
family" coverage. Although the district court 
found DOMA unconstitutional, it refused to 
resolve Hara's health coverage claim now 
because it still depends on Hara establishing 
eligibility for annuitant status, which is at 
issue in his pending Federal Circuit appeal. 
Whether or not Hara lacked standing, the 
district court showed prudence in deferring 
on this issue to the Federal Circuit. 
Hara says in substance that the Federal 
Circuit has to recognize his annuitant status 
because the Board has waived or forfeited 
any objection based on the failure to elect 
spousal survivor coverage; but the 
Department of Justice does not concede the 
point, which the Federal Circuit presumably 
will resolve. If Hara prevails there, district 
court injunctive relief to secure his health 
coverage is likely to be unnecessary, but our 
affirmance is without prejudice to such a 
future request by Hara. 
The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed for the reasons and to the extent 
stated above. Anticipating that certiorari will 
be sought and that Supreme Court review of 
DOMA is highly likely, the mandate is 
stayed, maintaining the district court's stay 
of its injunctive judgment, pending further 
order of this court. The parties will bear 
their own costs on these appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
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"Suit Cites States' Rights on Behalf of Gay Rights" 
The New York Times 
July 9,2012 
Adam Liptak 
The day after the Supreme Court announced 
its decision upholding President Obama's 
health care law, the next constitutional 
blockbuster arrived at the court. 
It is a rematch between the main lawyers in 
the health care case, and it replays some of 
the same themes. But now the issue is same-
sex marrIage. 
The question, again, is whether a federal 
law-this time the Defense of Marriage Act, 
or DOMA-passes constitutional muster. 
The law says the federal government must 
deny benefits to gay couples who are 
married in states that allow such unions. The 
law excludes same-sex spouses from 
benefits like Social Security payments, 
health insurance and burial services. 
"Until DOMA is repealed or invalidated," 
explained Walter Dellinger, who was acting 
United States solicitor general in the Clinton 
administration, "no gay couple is fully 
married." 
(It is worth pausing to point out what the 
new case is not about. It does not concern 
the law's other main part, the one that says 
states need not recogmze same-sex 
marriages from other states. It is also not 
about the more ambitious arguments made 
in a suit filed in California by Theodore B. 
Olson and David Boies, which seeks to 
establish a constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage.) 
The federal appeals court in Boston on May 
31 struck down the part of the marriage law 
that concerns federal benefits, saying there 
was no good reason to treat some married 
couples differently from others. 
On June 29, Paul D. Clement, who had 
learned the day before that he had largely 
lost the health care case, was back at the 
Supreme Court. He asked the justices to hear 
an appeal from the Boston decision and 
uphold the marriage law. 
Four days later, Solicitor General Donald B. 
Verrilli Jr., who had successfully defended 
the health care law, agreed that the new case 
warranted review. But he said the justices 
should strike down the marriage law. 
The appeals court ruling in Boston was 
largely based on equal protection principles. 
But there was a dash of federalism in it, too, 
one reminiscent of arguments in the health 
care case. 
Marriages have traditionally been governed 
by state law, Judge Michael Boudin wrote 
for a unanimous three-judge panel of the 
appeals court, raising federalism concerns 
that warranted a close look at whether the 
marriage law was justified. 
The trial judge, Joseph L. Tauro, had gone 
further, saying the marriage law overstepped 
Congress's power to attach conditions to 
federal grants to states. For instance, Judge 
Tauro wrote, the Department of Veterans 
Affairs had threatened to take back some 
$19 million from Massachusetts if it allowed 
the burial of a veteran's same-sex spouse in 
a cemetery that had been built and 
maintained with federal money. 
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Most people did not take that part of Judge 
Tauro's opinion very seriously, and the 
appeals court rejected it. But that was a 
month before the Supreme Court limited the 
health care law's Medicaid expansion along 
similar lines. 
The important point about federalism, said 
Mr. Dellinger, the former Clinton 
administration lawyer, is that two interests 
that are sometimes at odds in cases about 
same-sex marriage line up here. "Gay rights 
and states' rights are on the same side of the 
case," he said. 
Mr. Verrilli, for his part, finds himself in an 
awkward position. It is ordinarily the job of 
the executive branch to defend laws enacted 
by Congress, and the Justice Department did 
defend the marriage law early in the Obama 
administration. Last year, though, Attorney 
General Eric H. Holder Jr. announced an 
about-face, saying he and President Obama 
had concluded that the law was 
unconstitutional. 
The administration would continue to 
enforce the law, Mr. Holder said, but would 
no longer defend it in court. 
After the administration's move, House 
Republicans intervened in the case to defend 
the law. They turned to Mr. Clement, who 
sometimes seems to be handling every 
important case on the Supreme Court 
docket. 
In his Supreme Court petition, Mr. Clement 
wrote that the justices should hear the case 
because legislators were not equipped to 
litigate. "The House has been forced into the 
posItIOn of defending numerous lawsuits 
challenging DOMA across the nation," he 
said. "That is a role for which the Justice 
Department-not the House-is 
institutionally designed." 
The seven same-sex couples and three 
surviving spouses actually challenging the 
law have yet to be heard from, and they will 
presumably urge the Supreme Court to deny 
review. But there is every reason to think the 
court will agree to hear the case, or a similar 
one from California, shortly after the 
justices return from their summer break, 
with arguments around January and a 
decision by June. 
Both sides will be looking for suppOli in the 
principles that animated the health care 
decision. In his petition, Mr. Clement quoted 
an observation from Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr., one of Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts Jr.'s touchstones, that "judging the 
constitutionality of an act of Congress is the 
gravest and most delicate duty that this court 
is called on to perform." 
Mr. Verrilli went his adversary one better, 
actually citing the five-day-old health care 
decision, National Federation of 
Independent B1Isiness v. Sebelius, in what 
was probably its first appearance in a 
Supreme COUli brief. In the health care case, 
Mr. Verrilli reminded the justices, they 
appointed lawyers to argue positions that 
neither party had embraced. In the marriage 
case, where both the plaintiffs and the 
Justice Department now agree that the law is 
unconstitutional, Mr. Verrilli said, it would 
similarly be sensible to allow Mr. Clement 
to have his say. 
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"U.S. Files DOMA Challenges" 
SCOTUSblog 
July 3, 2012 
Lyle Denniston 
Seeking a clear-cut Supreme Court ruling 
against Congress's power to ban federal 
benefits for legally married same-sex 
couples, the Obama Administration on 
Tuesday afternoon filed two cases, and 
urged the Justices to allow the House GOP 
leaders to defend the law that the 
government now believes is 
unconstitutional. One petition ... involves a 
First Circuit Court ruling against the ban 
included in the Defense of Marriage Act. 
The second . . . asked the Court to pull up a 
case now pending in the Ninth Circuit 
Comi-a case in which a federal District 
judge in California nullified the ban. 
Although the Administration believes, after 
changing its position last year, that DOMA's 
Section 3 is invalid, and thus agrees with the 
lower court rulings, it contended that it still 
has the authority to be the one to appeal in 
order "to ensure that the judiciary is the final 
arbiter" of the issue. The House's 
Republican leaders, who have taken over the 
defense of DOMA, have already filed their 
own petition (now docketed as 12-13), but 
the government lawyers argued that the 
legislators do not have a legal right to appeal 
but should be allowed to take pati in the 
case anyway. If the lawmakers are allowed 
to do so, the new filing said, the Court need 
not rule on whether they were legally 
entitled to bring their own appeal. 
DOMA is a 1996 law signed by President 
Bill Clinton and passed with huge majorities 
in the House and Senate. It has two main 
provisions, but only one of those is at stake 
in the new cases. That is the provision that 
says that, whenever marriage is mentioned 
in a federal program or gets favored 
treatment as in the tax code, that means only 
a legally married man and woman. The other 
provision attempts to give the states a legal 
right to refuse to recognize same-sex 
marriages that are performed in other states. 
Gay rights advocates also oppose that 
provision, but it is not being put before the 
Court. 
The constitutional challenge to its marriage 
definition is not an attempt to establish a 
federal constitutional right for gays and 
lesbians to marry. In fact, the couples 
challenging DOMA are already legally 
married under their own states' laws, and are 
contending that excluding them from equal 
legal treatment is a form of unconstitutional 
discrimination. That was the basis for the 
First Circuit Court's ruling against Section 3 
at the end of May, and by U.S. District 
Judge Jeffrey White in San Francisco in 
February. 
Judge White's decision is now under review, 
on an expedited schedule in the Ninth 
Circuit, but by filing its petition in the 
Supreme Court at this stage, the Obama 
Administration sought to bypass that judicial 
rung in order to have a fuller review done by 
the Supreme Comi. The filing will have the 
effect of putting the Ninth Circuit's review 
on hold in the meantime. 
In urging that the Court put the Ninth Circuit 
case on a fast track to the Supreme Court, 
the new petition said that "authoritative 
resolution of the question is of great 
importance to the United States," to the 
individual federal court employee in the 
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case, and to "tens of thousands of others 
who are being denied the equal enjoyment 
of the benefits that federal law makes 
available to persons who are legally married 
under state law." 
Because both cases involve decisions that 
struck down a federal law, the chances are 
very strong that the Supreme Court will 
accept at least one of them for review in the 
next Term, opening October 1. The Court 
will not consider them during its summer 
recess, but they could be ready for action by 
the Justices at their first private Conference, 
now set for September 24. 
One of the key issues that will be before the 
Court is the constitutional test the Justices 
would apply to the federal ban. Although the 
Court has decided a number of major gay 
rights cases, it has never declared a specific 
standard-that is, it has not said whether a 
law need only have a "rational basis," 
whether it should have to meet some level of 
"heightened scrutiny," or whether it should 
have to satisfy the toughest test of all: "strict 
scrutiny." It has applied a variation of 
rational basis, without saying that should 
control in other cases. 
In the First Circuit, a somewhat mixed 
standard was applied, but Judge White 
applied "heightened scrutiny," as both of 
those courts nullified the federal ban. The 
Justice Department has now embraced the 
"heightened scrutiny" test and concluded 
that the ban cannot meet that hurdle. It has 
said, though, that it will continue to enforce 
the ban until its constitutionality is finally 
settled. 
The new cases have not yet been assigned 
docket numbers. Another same-sex marriage 
case is on its way to the Court, involving the 
constitutionality of California's voter-
approved "Proposition 8," banning all same-
sex marriages in that state. That cases thus 
raises a different constitutional issue than 
DOMA, involving whether a state is free to 
ban such marriages altogether. That case, as 
it went through the Ninth Circuit, became 
considerably narrower than it had been in 
District Court, but the Circuit Court did 
nullifY the state constitutional amendment 
approved as a ballot measure. 
UPDATED July 4: The government 
petitions on DOMA have been docketed as 
12-15 (First Circuit case) and 12- I 6 (District 
Court-Northern California case). The House 
GOP leaders' petition filed earlier is 
docketed as 12-13 (First Circuit case). The 
responses to all three are due August 2, 
unless extended.) 
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"Key Part of Federal Gay Marriage Law 
Ruled Unconstitutional" 
The Los Angeles Times 
May31,2012 
David G. Savage 
Advocates of same-sex marriage won a 
major legal victory-and greatly increased 
the odds of a U.S. Supreme Court 
showdown on the subject-as an appeals 
court ruled that the government could not 
deny tax, Social Security and other federal 
benefits to gay couples who were legally 
married in their home states. 
The ruling struck down a major part of the 
Defense of Marriage Act, or DOMA, the 
law adopted in 1996 that denied federal 
benefits to same-sex couples. The Obama 
administration had urged the court to 
overturn the law, saying it violated the 
constitutional rights of gay couples. 
The 3-0 decision by the federal appeals 
court in Boston sends the gay marriage issue 
toward the Supreme Court on two tracks. 
One track directly involves whether gays 
and lesbians have a constitutional right to 
marry. In that case, a federal appeals court in 
San Francisco shuck down California's 
Proposition 8, which had reversed the state 
Supreme Court's decision. The other track-
the current case-involves whether gay 
couples, once legally married, have a right 
to equal treatment. 
Both cases are likely to be appealed to the 
Supreme Court this year. The judges in 
Boston made it clear they had that in mind, 
and seemed to be tailoring their opinion for 
JusticeAnthony M. Kennedy. The U.S. 9th 
Circuit Court of Appeals also tailored its 
Proposition 8 opinion for Kennedy, who is 
likely to be the swing vote. 
The Boston-based judges of the U.S. 1st 
Circuit Court of Appeals, two of whom are 
Republican appointees, sounded a states' 
rights theme in Thursday's opInIOn. 
Marriage is a matter of state law, they said. 
And as such, they saw no valid justification 
for the federal government to "penalize" 
legally married same-sex couples by 
denying them the same benefits available to 
all other married couples. These include 
filing a joint tax return, obtaining family 
healthcare coverage for the spouse of a 
federal employee or receiving a survivor's 
benefit from Social Security. 
The Obama administration had reached the 
same conclusion last year and refused to 
defend this part of the law. House 
Republicans, led by SpeakerJohn A. 
Boehner of Ohio, vowed to carryon the 
defense. They hired Washington lawyer Paul 
Clement to argue in favor of limiting federal 
recognition of marriage to a "legal umon 
between one man and one woman." 
White House Press Secretary Jay Carney 
said President Obama agreed with the 
court's decision. The administration sent a 
lawyer to Boston to argue for striking down 
part of DOMA as a violation of equal 
protection. 
"There's no question that this [ decision] is 
in concert with the president's views," 
Carney said. 
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Congress passed DOMA to prevent a gay 
marriage in one state from being accorded 
legal recognition in other states. This 
provision was not at issue in Thursday's 
decision. Instead, the ruling arose from a 
challenge to the federal benefits provision 
filed by seven same-sex couples who were 
married in Massachusetts and sought equal 
benefits as married couples. 
The judges steered clear of strong wording 
or sweeping conclusions about the legal 
status of gays. They did, however, cite 
Kennedy's 1996 opinion that stlUck down an 
anti-gay voter initiative in Colorado. 
The judges in Boston conceded their lUling 
was only a stepping stone. 
"Only the Supreme Court can finally decide 
this unique case," Judge Michael Boudin 
wrote. They put their decision on hold until 
the law's defenders could appeal. 
Clement pledged to do just that. "We have 
always been clear we expect this matter 
ultimately to be decided by the Supreme 
Court, and that has not changed," he said. 
Nonetheless, gay rights advocates hailed the 
lUling as another step toward full legal 
equality for gays and lesbians. 
DOMA created "a classic double standard, 
whereby gay people were singled out for 
discrimination," said Mary Bonauto, a 
lawyer for Gay & Lesbian Advocates & 
Defenders, the Boston-based group that sued 
on behalf of the seven same-sex couples. 
The lead plaintiff, Nancy Gill, is a postal 
worker who sought health benefits for her 
spouse. Massachusetts filed a similar suit 
against the government, stressing the states' 
rights issue. 
Suzanne Goldberg, a Columbia University 
law professor, said the court's opinion 
"helps to sound the death knell for DOMA. 
The 1 st Circuit explained, clearly and 
simply, that denying same-sex couples the 
benefits of marriage will not support 
heterosexuals' marriages." 
The National Organization for Marriage 
sharply criticized the lUling. "It's obvious 
that the federal courts on both coasts are 
intent on imposing their liberal, elitist views 
of marriage on the American people," said 
Brian Brown, the group's president. "They 
dismiss the centuries-old understanding of 
marriage as a critical social institution that 
exists for the benefit of couples and their 
children." 
The Massachusetts state high court was the 
nation's first, in 2003, to declare gays and 
lesbians had a right to marry. Since then, 
more than 100,000 same-sex couples have 
wed legally there and in other states where 
gay marriage was legal, according to the 
cOUli's OpInIOn. That includes Iowa, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, New York, 
Vermont and, before Proposition 8, 
California. Two other states, Washington 
and Maryland, have passed gay marriage 
laws that could face voter initiatives in 
November. The District of Columbia also 
permits same-sex marriage. 
The opinion by Boudin, an appointee of 
President George H.W. Bush, was joined by 
Chief Judge Sandra Lynch, a Bill Clinton 
appointee, and Judge Juan TorlUella, a 
Ronald Reagan appointee. 
The broader right-to-marry issue is likely to 
reach the high court in the California case, 
now awaiting a possible review by the full 
U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. 
449 
A federal judge in San Francisco and a 
three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit struck 
down Proposition 8, the voter initiative that 
limited marriage to a man and a woman. 
Both decisions relied on the Constitution's 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 
Defenders of Proposition 8 asked the full 9th 
Circuit to review the panel's decision. If that 
fails, they can appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
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"Appeals Court Hears Arguments on Gay Marriage Law" 
The New York Times 
April 4, 2012 
Abby Goodnough 
A federal appeals court panel heard 
arguments Wednesday on whether to uphold 
a lower couti's finding that a section of the 
1996 law banning federal recognition of 
same-sex marriage is unconstitutional. 
The case is the first challenge to the so-
called Defense of Marriage Act, or DOMA, 
to reach a federal appeals couti. In July 
2010, Judge Joseph L. Tauro of the United 
States District Court in Boston sided with 
the plaintiffs in two separate cases brought 
by the state attorney general and a gay rights 
group. 
One issue under consideration is whether the 
law wrongly denies federal benefits, like 
Social Security survivors' payments and the 
right to file taxes jointly, to married same-
sex couples, thus violating their equal 
protection rights. 
In the case brought by Matiha Coakley, the 
Massachusetts attorney general, Judge Tauro 
found in 2010 that DOMA compels 
Massachusetts to discriminate against gay 
couples who are legally married under state 
law in order for the commonwealth to 
receive federal money for certain programs. 
The other case, brought by Gay and Lesbian 
Advocates and Defenders, focused more 
narrowly on equal protection as applied to 
federal benefits. In that case, Judge Tauro 
agreed in 20 I 0 that the law violated the 
equal protection clause of the Constitution 
by denying benefits to one class of married 
couples-gay men and lesbians-but not 
others. 
The Obama administration initially appealed 
the lower court's ruling. But last year, the 
Justice Depatiment announced that it would 
stop defending DOMA, leaving Congress to 
appeal Judge Tauro's ruling to the First 
Circuit. The House of Representatives' 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group stepped in, 
hiring Paul D. Clement, a former United 
States solicitor general, to argue the appeal. 
Massachusetts became the first state in the 
country to allow same-sex marriage in 2004. 
Other states have followed, and gay rights 
suppOliers are hoping that a series of legal 
challenges to DOMA around the country 
will ultimately lead to a Supreme Court 
ruling on the law. Judge Tauro struck down 
the section of the law that defines marriage 
as the union of a man and a woman for all 
federal purposes. 
At the federal coutihouse here on 
Wednesday, the arguments focused on what 
the appropriate constitutional test for 
DOMA should be: the relatively easy 
standard known as "rational basis," or a 
tougher review that requires heightened 
scrutiny. 
Mr. Clement-who last week argued before 
the Supreme Court on behalf of states 
challenging President Obama's health care 
law-told the appeals panel that Congress 
had a rational basis for defining marriage as 
between a man and a woman. He said that in 
1996, as Hawaii appeared to be the first state 
moving toward recognizing same-sex 
marriage, Congress passed the law out of 
concern that it should have its own 
definition of marriage. 
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"Congress could rationally choose to have a 
uniform definition rather than have it rely 
upon state law," Mr. Clement said. 
But Mary Bonauto, who argued on behalf of 
Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, 
said that "the central question is what 
federal interest is served in singling out only 
same-sex marriages" as invalid. 
"We believe the Defense of Marriage Act is 
an irrational, arbitrary classification of gay 
people for its own sake and not for any other 
purpose," she said. 
In the Coakley case, Judge Tauro had held 
that that federal restrictions on financing for 
states that recognize same-sex marriage 
violates the 10th Amendment-the part of 
the Constitution that declares that rights not 
explicitly granted to the federal government, 
or denied to the states, belong to the states. 
Maura Healey, the assistant attorney general 
who argued on behalf of Ms. Coakley, told 
the panel that DOMA requires 
Massachusetts "to live with two distinct and 
unequal forms of marriage." She added, 
"This is a burden that Congress has imposed 
on Massachusetts simply because it doesn't 
like the fact that gay. people are getting 
married." 
Stuart F. Delery, the Justice Department's 
acting assistant attorney general for the civil 
division, also argued before the panel, 
saying that the court should hold DOMA to 
heightened scrutiny because it targets "a 
group with a long and deep history of 
discrimination. " 
The three judges on the panel directed most 
of their questions at Mr. Clement and Mr. 
Delery. But the questions were measured 
and did not shed much light on how the 
court might rule. The judges-Juan 
Torruella, Michael Boudin and Sandra 
Lynch, the First Circuit's chief judge-were 
appointed by Presidents Ronald Reagan, the 
elder George Bush and Bill Clinton, 
respectively. 
Afterward, Ms. Coakley said she could not 
make predictions based on the judges' 
questions but added: "When you look at, to 
me, the thinness of the legal argument on the 
other side and really the emotional and real 
fact-based arguments made by the plaintiffs, 
I'm confident that Judge Tauro will be 
upheld." 
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"Court Puts Review of DOMA Ruling on Hold" 
The San Francisco Chronicle 
July 27,2012 
Bob Egelko 
A U.S. appeals court put a San Francisco 
woman's suit seeking federal benefits for 
same-sex married couples on hold Friday 
until the Supreme Court decides whether to 
review the 1996 law that prohibited those 
benefits. 
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in 
San Francisco canceled the hearing it had 
scheduled Sept. lain the case of Karen 
Golinski, a lesbian attorney with the appeals 
court who had challenged the government's 
denial of family insurance coverage for her 
wife. 
The cOUli said it would wait to see whether 
the nation's high court takes the case out of 
its hands by granting the 
Obamaadministration's request for 
immediate review. 
The administration, joined by Golinski, has 
asked the Supreme Court to bypass the 
appeals court and use the case to consider 
the constitutionality of the Defense of 
Marriage Act. 
The law, known as DOMA, bars federal 
family insurance coverage, joint tax filing, 
immigration sponsorship and more than 
1,000 other federal marital benefits for 
same-sex couples who are legally married 
under state law. 
House Republican leaders have also asked 
the Supreme Court to review DOMA in an 
appeal of a federal Circuit Court lUling in 
Boston that found the law unconstitutional. 
Republicans hired attorneys to defend 
DOMA after President Obama withdrew his 
administration's support of the law in 
February 2011. 
In Golinski's case, U.S. District Judge 
Jeffrey White of San Francisco IUled in 
February that DOMA was a discriminatory 
law, rooted in anti gay bias, and served no 
legitimate government purpose. The 
government has complied with the lUling by 
extending insurance coverage to Amy 
Cunninghis, whom Golinski wed in 2008 
before Californians banned same-sex 
marriage by passing Proposition 8. 
House Republicans have appealed White's 
ruling, arguing that withholding federal 
benefits from same-sex couples was a 
rational way to save federal funds, 
encourage responsible child-rearing and 
leave the volatile marriage issue to the 
states. 
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"83-year-old Asks Supreme Court to 
Review Gay Marriage Ban" 
Re1lters 
July 16,2012 
Terry Baynes 
An ailing 83-year-old lesbian asked the 
Supreme Court on Monday to hear her legal 
challenge against a federal law that defines 
marriage as a union between a man and 
woman, attempting to place her case on a 
fast-track to the top court. 
The suit, filed by Edith Schlain Windsor in 
2010, targets the Defense of Marriage Act, a 
law passed by the U.S. Congress in 1996 
that denies federal benefits to lawfully 
married same-sex couples. 
Windsor's petition attempts to bypass the 
U.S. Court of Appeals, which is slated to 
hear the case in September. 
With Windsor's filing, there are three 
petitions pending before the Supreme Court 
over the constitutionality of the Defense of 
Marriage Act, an issue the high court could 
take up in oral arguments as early as next 
spring, said Windsor's lawyer Roberta 
Kaplan, of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & 
Garrison LLP. 
"This case presents a question of exceptional 
national impOliance: the constitutionality of 
a statute, the Defense of Marriage Act 
(,DOMA'), that daily affects the lives of 
thousands of Americans," the petition said. 
In June, a New York district court ruled in 
Windsor's favor, finding that a central 
provision of the law discriminates against 
married same-sex couples. The case is now 
on expedited appeal before the 2nd U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
But Windsor's lawyers argue that premature 
review of her case by the Supreme Comt is 
warranted since the issue is already before 
the court. Also, Windsor suffers from a heart 
condition that could end her life before the 
case is resolved. 
The American Civil Libelties Union 
originally filed the suit in New York on 
behalf of Windsor, a former computer 
programmer who married Thea Clara Spyer 
in Toronto, Canada, in 2007. The two were 
engaged in 1967. 
Spyer died in 2009 after a long battle with 
multiple sclerosis, leaving her property to 
Windsor. Because the marriage was not 
recognized under federal law, Windsor had 
to pay more than $363,000 in federal estate 
taxes, according to the suit. 
Six states have legalized same-sex marriage 
since DOMA went into effect, including 
New York in 2011. But federal law and 
programs do not recognize those marriages 
because ofDOMA. 
Windsor's attorneys argue that the federal 
law violates the 14th Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution which prohibits states 
from denying people equal protection under 
the laws. 
Federal courts in New York, California and 
Massachusetts all found the law 
unconstitutional for different reasons, 
applying varying standards of legal analysis. 
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The Republican-controlled House of 
Representatives, through its Bipartisan 
Legal AdvisOlY Group (BLAG), is 
defending the law, which the Obama 
administration has largely abandoned. 
President Barack Obama in 2011 instructed 
the Justice Department to stop defending the 
law in courts, finding it unconstitutional. 
Paul Clement, a lawyer for BLAG, did not 
immediately respond to a request for 
comment on Windsor's petition. 
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"Obama Team Won't Defend Defense 
of Marriage Act" 
USA Today 
February 24,2011 
Kevin Johnson and Joan Biskupic 
The Obama administration will no longer 
defend a law that bans federal recognition of 
same-sex marriage - a major legal reversal 
that reinvigorates a national debate over gay 
rights. 
The decision, outlined Wednesday by 
Attorney General Eric Holder, represents the 
administration's strongest legal advocacy for 
the rights of gay men and lesbians, who 
have strongly opposed the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA). The law defines 
marriage as only between a man and a 
woman. 
"Much of the legal landscape has changed in 
the 15 years since Congress passed 
DOMA," Holder said. "The Supreme Court 
has ruled that laws criminalizing 
homosexual conduct are unconstitutional. 
Congress has repealed the military's 'don't 
ask, don't tell' policy .... But while both the 
wisdom and the legality of DOMA will 
continue to be the subject of extensive 
litigation and public debate, this 
administration will no longer assert its 
constitutionality in court." 
Holder said he was following President 
Obama's lead and laid out reasons why 
government action that treats gay people 
differently than straight people is subject to 
court scrutiny. He noted his action departed 
from a practice of defending federal laws, 
but said the legislative record that led to 
DOMA's passage had "numerous 
expressions reflecting moral disapproval of 
gays and lesbians and their intimate family 
relationships-precisely the kind of 
stereotype-based thinking and animus the 
Equal Protection clause is designed to guard 
against." 
"This is huge," said NOlihwestern 
University law professor Andrew 
Koppelman, an expert on gays' legal rights. 
"For the first time, the president of the 
United States has taken the position that 
laws that discriminate against gays are 
unconstitutional. " 
White House spokesman Jay Carney said 
Obama is "still grappling" with his personal 
views on gay marriage, but regards the law 
as "unfair." 
The action, prompted by a court-ordered 
filing deadline in two pending legal 
challenges to the law in New York and 
Connecticut, triggered a divided response. 
"While Americans want Washington to 
focus on creating jobs and cutting spending, 
the president will have to explain why he 
thinks now is the appropriate time to stir up 
a controversial issue," said Brendan Buck, a 
spokesman for Republican House Speaker 
John Boehner. 
Gay-rights advocates lauded the move as a 
landmark for gays' legal rights. Edith 
Windsor, who is one of the challengers to 
the federal law, said the administration had 
"done the right thing." 
Windsor, who in 2007 married Thea Spyer 
in Canada, sued the government for refusing 
to recognize her relationship and imposing a 
$350,000 tax on Spyer's estate when she 
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died in 2009. Had Spyer been a man, 
Windsor argues, she would not have had to 
pay the tax because spouses are exempt. "I 
knew that the government would never be 
able to justify that 1 had to pay a $350,000 
estate tax simply because I was married to a 
woman," she said. 
Five states and D.C. allow gay people to 
marry. On Wednesday, Hawaii Gov. Neil 
Abercrombie, a Democrat, signed same-sex 
civil unions into law. 
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"Court Strikes Down Ban on Gay 
Marriage in California" 
The New York Times 
February 7, 2012 
Adam Nagourney 
A federal appeals court panel on Tuesday 
threw out a voter-approved ban on same-sex 
marriage passed in 2008, upholding a lower 
court's ruling that the ban, known as 
Proposition 8, violated the constitutional 
rights of gay men and lesbians in California. 
The three-judge panel issued its ruling in 
San Francisco, upholding a 2010 decision by 
Judge Vaughn R. Walker, who had been the 
chief judge of the Federal District Comi of 
the Northern District of California but has 
since retired. The panel found that 
Proposition 8-passed by a vote of 52 
percent to 48 percent-violated the equal 
protection rights of two same-sex couples 
who brought the suit. The proposition placed 
a specific prohibition in the State 
Constitution against marriage between two 
people of the same sex. 
But Tuesday's 2-to-l decision was much 
more narrowly framed than the sweeping 
ruling of Judge Walker, who asselied that 
barring same-sex couples from marrying 
was a violation of the equal protection and 
due process clauses of the Constitution. 
The two judges on Tuesday stated explicitly 
that they were not deciding whether there 
was a constitutional right for same-sex 
couples to marry, instead ruling that the 
disparate treatment of married couples and 
domestic partners since the passage of 
Proposition 8 violated the Constitution's 
Equal Protection Clause. 
"Although the Constitution permits 
communities to enact most laws they believe 
to be desirable, it requires that there be at 
least a legitimate reason for the passage of a 
law that treats different classes of people 
differently," Judge Stephen R. Reinhardt 
wrote in the decision. "There was no such 
reason that Proposition 8 could have been 
enacted." 
"All that Proposition 8 accomplished was to 
take away from same-sex couples the right 
to be granted marriage licenses and thus 
legally to use the designation 'marriage, ", 
the judge wrote, adding, "Proposition 8 
serves no purpose, and has no effect, other 
than to lessen the status and human dignity 
of gay men and lesbians in California." 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge N. Randy 
Smith wrote that the court was overreaching 
in nullifying a voter initiative. 
Unlike the 2008 State Supreme Court 
decision here overturning an earlier ban on 
same-sex marriage, this decision is not about 
to set off a race to the chapel by same-sex 
couples. A stay imposed on Judge Walker's 
original decision will remain in place, at 
least for two weeks. Theodore B. Olson, one 
of the lawyers who challenged the ban, said 
he would seek to get the stay lifted; backers 
of Proposition 8 said they would oppose 
that. 
Both sides in the case made clear that they 
intended to take the case before the Supreme 
Court in hopes of prompting it to settle once 
and for all an issue that has been fought out 
in comis, legislatures and ballot boxes since 
at least a 1971 case in Minnesota. That said, 
458 
there is no guarantee the court will take it. 
The narrow parameters of the ruling's 
reasoning-and the fact that it was written 
to apply only to California-may prompt the 
cOUli to wait for a clearer dispute before 
weighing in. 
Whatever the legal nuances of the 
decision-and lawyers were battling about 
how far-reaching it would prove to be-the 
decision reverberated throughout political 
circles, from the presidential campaign to 
state legislatures. 
Mitt Romney denounced the decision as an 
attack by "unelected judges" on "traditional 
marriage" and predicted that the Supreme 
Court would decide the issue. "That 
prospect underscores the vital importance of 
this election and the movement to preserve 
our values," he said. 
Still, the decision by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, coming at a 
time when Washington State seems poised 
to become the seventh state to legalize 
same-sex marriages, seems likely to add to 
what members of both patiies said was a 
sense of momentum. Chad Griffin, the 
president of the American Foundation for 
Equal Rights, which challenged Proposition 
8, noted that polls in the past year had 
shown public suppOli for same-sex marriage 
steadily increasing, a significant change 
from just a decade ago. 
In New Jersey, State Senator Stephen M. 
Sweeney, a Democrat and president of the 
Senate, who abstained in a vote on a same-
sex marriage bill two years ago, is now 
championing one that is to come up for a 
vote next Tuesday. "Today's court ruling 
simply reaffirmed what we already knew: 
Marriage equality is right, and its time is 
now," he said. 
Proponents of Proposition 8 expressed 
disappointment, but said they were not 
surprised, given the nature of the Ninth 
Circuit, which they view as liberal, and 
predicted the ruling would fail before the 
Supreme Court. Several said the decision 
was narrow enough that it was more 
unlikely now that the Supreme Court, if it 
accepted the case, would use it to establish a 
constitutional right to same-sex marriage. 
"Since the beginning of this case, we've 
known that the battle to preserve traditional 
marriage will ultimately be won or lost not 
here, but rather in the U.S. Supreme COUli," 
said Andrew P. Pugno, general counsel for 
the ProtectMarriage.com coalition, which 
was behind Proposition 8. "We will 
immediately appeal this misguided decision 
that disregards the will of more than seven 
million Californians who voted to restore 
marriage as the unique union of only a man 
and woman." 
Mr. Pugno said he had not decided whether 
he would appeal to the Supreme Court or 
ask a larger panel of the Ninth Circuit Court 
to review this decision. 
Douglas NeJaime, an associate professor at 
Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, said the 
narrowness of the decision could influence 
the Supreme Court to take a road it often 
favored: issuing narrow and incremental 
decisions, not sweeping ones. "It's striking 
that the court-or at least the two judges-
went out of their way to define the judgment 
as narrowly as they could," he said. 
Mr. Olson hailed the decision, saying it was 
a "huge day," and noted that the judges had, 
in the course of their 89-page majority 
decision, systematically rebutted most of the 
arguments that had been made against gay 
marnage. 
459 
"I'm not at all surprised that the court didn't 
go further than it needed to go," he said. "If 
it had, it might have been criticized for 
reaching more than it should." 
The emotional repercussions were on 
display as Spencer Perry, 17, the son of one 
of the couples who initiated the case, turned 
out to praise it. "With this ruling, in the eyes 
of the government, my family is finally 
normal," he said as his mother looked on. 
John Schwatiz contributed reporting from 
New York, and Ian Lovett from Los 
Angeles. 
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"Gay Marriage Fight May Hinge on Supreme 
Court's Anthony Kennedy" 
Los Angeles Times 
February 8, 2012 
David G. Savage 
The Supreme Court has nine justices, but if 
the constitutional fight over same-sex 
marriage reaches them this year, the 
decision will probably come down to just 
one: a California Republican and Reagan-
era conservative who has nonetheless 
written the comi's two leading gay rights 
opinions. \ 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 75, often 
holds the court's deciding vote on the major 
issues that divide its liberals and 
conservatives. More often than not, that vote 
has swung the court to the right. But on gay 
rights, Kennedy has been anything but a 
"culture wars" conservative. 
One of his opinions lauded the intimacy 
between same-sex couples and demanded 
"respect for their private lives," provoking 
Justice Antonin Scalia to accuse him of 
having "signed on to the so-called 
homosexual agenda." 
"He is a California establishment 
Republican with moderately libertarian 
instincts," Stanford University law professor 
Pamela Karlan said of Kennedy. "He travels 
in circles where he has met and likes lots of 
gay people." 
Based on Kennedy's past opinions, Karlan is 
confident that if the Supreme Court takes up 
the issue of California's same-sex marriage 
ban, "it meansProp. 8 is going down to 
defeat," she said. "There is no way he will 
take it to reinstate" the ban. 
Not all court observers share her prediction, 
but the uncertainty about how Kennedy 
might vote may, by itself, be enough to deter 
the high court from hearing an appeal of the 
decision by the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of 
Appeals. Four justices must vote for the 
court to consider a case, but a majority is 
needed to issue a ruling. 
When an appeal reaches the high court, the 
four most conservative justices will face a 
tough choice: Vote to have the court hear the 
case and run the risk that Kennedy would 
side with the more liberal justices to go 
beyond the 9th Circuit decision and establish 
a nationwide right to same-sex marriage. Or 
turn the case aside, leaving same-sex 
marriage intact in California but setting no 
national precedent. 
The man at the center of the speculation 
grew up in a Catholic family in Sacramento, 
where his father was a lawyer and lobbyist 
in the Legislature. Family friends included 
then-Gov. Earl Warren. As a Harvard law 
student, the young Kennedy visited the 
Supreme Court to meet with Warren, who 
was then chief justice. 
As a justice since 1988, Kennedy has 
reflected at times both styles of 
Republicanism: the conservatism and 
respect for states' rights of Reagan, who 
appointed him, as well as Warren's devotion 
to civil rights and fair treatment. 
Two years ago he wrote the much-disputed 
5-4 opinion in the Citizens United case that 
said corporations and unions had a free-
speech right to spend freely on election 
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campaigns. But also that year Kennedy 
wrote a 5-4 opinion that struck down as 
cruel and unusual punishment the laws in 
Florida and elsewhere under which juvenile 
offenders were sent to prison for life for 
crimes that did not involve a murder. 
Sounding a bit like Warren, Kennedy said it 
was unfair to close the prison doors forever 
on youths who had gone wrong. 
Eight years ago he wrote the decision that 
declared unconstitutional laws in Texas and 
elsewhere that made gays subject to arrest 
for "deviate" sexual conduct. "The state 
cannot demean" same-sex couples by 
making their intimate, private conduct into a 
crime, Kennedy said. 
In 1996, he wrote an opinion in a Colorado 
case called Romer vs. Evans that formed the 
basis for Tuesday's 9th Circuit decision 
striking down Proposition 8. 
Colorado voters had approved an initiative 
that stripped gays and lesbians of civil rights 
protections under state and local ordinances. 
Kennedy said the law could not stand 
because it was "born of animosity" toward 
homosexuals and took away their hard-won 
legal rights. 
In Tuesday's decision, Judge Stephen 
Reinhardt of Los Angeles did not say gays 
had a right to marry as a matter of equal 
treatment. Instead, he focused on same-sex 
marriage in California and repeated 
Kennedy's view that voters could not take 
away the rights gays had briefly won. "Prop. 
8 singles out same-sex couples for unequal 
treatment by taking away from them alone 
the right to marry," Reinhardt wrote, citing 
Romer vs. Evans. 
Kennedy sits III the middle of two 
ideological blocs likely to split evenly on the 
question of same-sex marriage. The four 
conservatives-Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts Jr.and Justices Scalia, Clarence 
Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr.-are likely 
to oppose the 9th Circuit's decision on the 
grounds that judges should not force such a 
change in state law. The four liberals-
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. 
Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena 
Kagan-are likely to support the 9th 
Circuit's decision as a matter of equal 
treatment. 
"Both sides will be nervous," said Michael 
Dorf, a Cornell University law professor 
who has clerked for Reinhardt and Kennedy. 
The California-only approach taken by 
Reinhardt would allow the high court to pass 
up the case, but he and others predict the 
justices will hear it. "This legalizes same-
sex marriage in the biggest state. That's a 
big deal in itself," Dorf said. 
Chapman University law professor John 
Eastman said conservatives had not given up 
on Kennedy. 
"I know some people say Justice Kennedy 
will ask: Should we stop the progress now? I 
think Justice Kennedy will ask: Do we want 
to put a stake in the heart of an institution, 
marriage, that has done so much for 
society?" he said. 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, dean of UC 
Irvine Law School, believes Kennedy will 
play the crucial role and write a broader 
opinion that undercuts other state laws 
banning same-sex marriage. "This is a court 
that wants to have the last word on major 
legal issues," he said. 
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"Further Prop. 8 Review Denied by Court of Appeals" 
SCOTUSblog 
June 5, 2012 
Lyle Denniston 
The Ninth Circuit Court refused on Tuesday 
to reconsider the decision in February 
striking down California's Proposition 8, the 
voter-approved ban on same-sex marriages 
in the state. The Court, however, put the 
case on hold for at least 90 days to allow the 
proponents of the ballot measure to seek to 
appeal to the Supreme Court. The denial 
came over the dissents of three judges, who 
called this a "momentous case" and argued 
that the divided decision of a three-judge 
panel had resulted from a "gross 
misapplication" of a key Supreme Court 
ruling on gay rights. One other judge 
dissented, but did not join the three in their 
objection .... 
The ruling will set the stage for a major test 
in the Supreme Court, although the panel 
ruling is a narrow one that explicitly avoided 
deciding whether gays and lesbians have a 
constitutional right to get married. The two 
judges who were in the majority in ruling 
against Proposition 8 briefly defended the 
narrowness of their decision in a concurring 
opinion Tuesday. 
After the panel decision, the supporters of 
the measure had asked the full Circuit Court 
to reconsider the case en bane. At the 
request of an unidentified judge, a vote was 
taken among the 25 judges eligible to vote 
on the question, and a majority of 13 would 
have been required to grant such review. 
The final vote thus appeared to be 21-4, 
because the dissenting member of the panel 
favored en bane review, but did not join the 
dissenting opinion by three other jUdges. 
Because the Circuit Court's decision is now 
on hold, not only for 90 days, but also-if 
the Justices grant review-for all of the time 
that the Supreme Court takes to decide it, 
that could make it unnecessary for the 
backers of Proposition 8 to file a quick plea 
for help from the Supreme Comi. The case 
almost celiainly could not be heard, in any 
event, until the new Term, starting October 
1, since the Justices are likely to go into 
summer recess later this month. If review 
were granted, the case probably would not 
even be heard until weeks after the 
November elections this year. 
The Ninth Circuit panel, and a three-judge 
panel of the First Circuit, have now issued 
gay marriage decisions that avoid the issue 
of whether the Constitution assures gays and 
lesbians of any right to civil marriage. In 
both of the panel decisions, the two Circuit 
Courts relied upon findings that excluding 
homosexuals from equal access to marriage 
or to the benefits of marriage was based 
upon discrimination against them because of 
their sexual identities. That approach is 
keyed to a series of modern Supreme Court 
rulings that have held that hostility to 
homosexuality, or moral objection to it, is 
not a valid basis for singling out gays and 
lesbians for less favorable treatment in 
public policy. The Supreme Court has never 
recognized a right to same-sex marriage. 
The First Circuit Court, unlike the Ninth 
Circuit, did not strike down a state law, but 
rather ruled unconstitutional a part of a 1996 
federal law, the Defense of Marriage Act, 
that provided federal benefits for marriage 
only for opposite-sex couples. 
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Tuesday's developments in the Ninth Circuit 
Court illustrated just how contentious the 
issue of same-sex marriage remains in 
American society. The three dissenting 
judges who joined in a separate opinion 
accused the majority of the court of having 
"silenced any . . . respectful conversations" 
about the issue; they noted that President 
Obama, in a recent statement saying he 
supports same-sex marriage, had also urged 
the nation to talk about the issue in a 
"respectful manner." 
Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain wrote 
the dissenting opinion, joined by Circuit 
Judges Jay S. Bybee and Carlos Bea. Their 
opinion said that the majority has now 
"declared that animus must have been the 
only conceivable motivation for a sovereign 
state to have remained committed to a 
definition of marriage that has existed for 
millennia. . . . Even worse, we have 
ovenuled the will of seven million 
California Proposition 8 voters based on a 
reading of Romer [v. Evans] that would be 
unrecognizable to the Justices who joined it, 
to those who dissented from it, and to the 
judges from sister circuits who have since 
interpreted it. We should not have so 
roundly trumped California's democratic 
process without at least discussing this 
unparalleled decision as an en banc court." 
Circuit Judge N. Randy Smith, who had 
dissented from the panel lUling, said 
Tuesday he would have granted en banc 
review, but he wrote no opinion. 
Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt, the author 
of the panel decision, wrote a short 
concurring opinion joined by his colleague 
on the panel, Circuit Judge Michael Daly 
Hawkins. They said they were puzzled by 
Judge O'Scannlain's "unusual reliance" on 
comments by President Obama, because, 
they said, the President had made no 
mention of "the narrow issue that we 
decided." 
They added: "We held only that under the 
particular circumstances relating to 
California's Proposition 8, that measure was 
invalid. In line with the rules governing 
judicial resolution of constitutional issues, 
we did not resolve the fundamental question 
that both sides asked us to: whether the 
Constitution prohibits the states from 
banning same-sex marriage. That question 
may be decided in the near future, but if so, 
it should be in some other case, at some 
other time." 
Because the stay order was issued, no new 
same-sex marriages may be performed in 
California under the panel decision. Some 
18,000 couples were married in California, 
during the period between the time the state 
Supreme COUl1 had ruled that such a right 
existed under the state constitution and the 
vote by California voters in November 2008 
to take away that right for gays and lesbians. 
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"Gay-Marriage Foes Seek High Court Review" 
The Wall Street JOllrnal 
July 31,2012 
Jess Bravin 
Opponents of same-sex marriage asked the 
U.S. Supreme Court Tuesday to hear their 
case for reinstating Califomia's Proposition 
8, a voter initiative limiting marriage to 
heterosexuals that was ruled unconstitutional 
by lower courts. 
The petition is the second major marriage 
case to reach the justices' door this year, 
after parties on both sides asked the high 
court to settle the constitutionality of the 
Defense of Marriage Act, a 1996 federal law 
denying benefits to same-sex spouses that 
lower courts also found invalid. 
The court is widely expected to hear one or 
both of the cases, with arguments likely by 
early next year and a ruling before July. 
Although both cases involve gay marriage, 
each presents distinct legal issues, meaning 
the justices need not recognize a broad right 
to same-sex marriage even if they rule 
Proposition 8 and the Defense of Marriage 
Act unconstitutional. 
In May 2008, the Califomia Supreme C0U11 
held that the state constitution, which 
guarantees individuals liberty, privacy and 
equal protection of the laws, required 
recognition of same-sex marriage. 
Opponents quickly qualified a ballot 
initiative to amend the state constitution to 
limit marriage to heterosexual couples and 
the measure, Proposition 8, passed in 
November 2008. 
Same-sex marriage advocates, led by the 
bipartisan legal team of Ted Olson and 
David Boies, challenged Proposition 8 in 
federal court. Conservative activists behind 
the initiative stepped in to defend 
Proposition 8 after state officials, including 
Republican Gov. Amold Schwarzenegger 
and his Democratic successor, Edmund G. 
(Jerry) Brown Jr., declined to do so. 
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 
based in San Francisco, affirmed a district 
court that found Proposition 8 
unconstitutional. But the Ninth Circuit 
didn't find a general right to same-sex 
marriage. Instead, its opinion focused on the 
fact that the voter initiative withdrew from a 
minority group a right previously recognized 
by the state constitution. More than 18,000 
marriage licenses were issued to same-sex 
couples before voters rescinded their 
marriage rights. 
The court based its ruling on a 1996 
Supreme Court precedent by Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, which said Colorado 
couldn't withdraw protections for gays and 
lesbians once they were granted. 
In their Supreme Court filing, Proposition 8 
backers said the Ninth Circuit got it wrong. 
Unlike the "exceptionally harsh and 
unprecedented character" of the Colorado 
measure, Califomia law remained friendly to 
gays and lesbians, they said, recognizing 
domestic partnerships nearly equivalent to 
heterosexual marriage. 
California voters made a rational choice in 
deciding that the label marriage should 
apply only to heterosexual partnerships, the 
petition says, because the concept evolved to 
channel "the unique procreative potential of 
465 
sexual relationships between men and 
women" into family units whose stability is 
reinforced by law. 
For support, the Proposition 8 team invoked 
President Barack Obama, who, in an 
interview announcing his personal support 
for same-sex marriage, said those on the 
other side weren't "mean-spirited." 
The petition also cites an expert, David 
Blankenhorn, who testified at the 
Proposition 8 trial in 2010 that permitting 
gays and lesbians to marry would be 
harmful to children. 
In June, however, Mr. Blankenhorn, founder 
of the Institute for American Values, said he 
had come to accept gay marriage as more 
beneficial than harmful to society. He wrote 
in a New York Times op-ed that "to my 
deep regret, much of the opposition to gay 
marriage seems to stem, at least in part, from 
an underlying anti-gay animus." 
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"A New Test on Gay Rights" 
SCOTUSblog 
July 10,2012 
Lyle Denniston 
With the Supreme Court's next Term 
already shaping up as a historic one on the 
rights of gays and lesbians, Arizona officials 
have raised a significant new question for 
the Justices: if a state bans gay marriage, can 
it then take away unwed same-sex couples' 
access to state benefits that go only to those 
who can marry? The Ninth Circuit Court 
said no, but dissenting judges argued that the 
ruling amounted to a ban on states acting to 
protect a traditional view of marriage. That 
complaint may add to the Supreme Court's 
willingness to hear the state's new appeal 
(Brewer v. Diaz, filed last week). 
The case illustrates a trend that is beginning 
to develop in lower cOUlis dealing with 
issues of gay marriage: they are establishing 
new rights to legal equality for such couples, 
without taking the constitutional step of 
creating an explicit new right for gays and 
lesbians to marry. That was what lower 
cOUlis did in two cases that have already 
reached the Court, involving the 
constitutionality of the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act, and in a case due to reach the 
COUli soon on California's "Proposition 8" 
ban on such marriages. It happened again in 
the Arizona case newly arrived at the Court, 
although the dissenters said that the decision 
there implicates states' power to limit 
marriage rights. 
Arizona is one of 39 states that ban same-
sex marriage. In November 2008, its voters 
approved "Proposition 120," declaring that 
"only a union of one man and one woman 
shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in 
this state." 
That vote came only seven months after the 
state government changed policy, and began 
offering health care benefits to "domestic 
patiners" of state employees-a new 
opportunity given equally to unmarried 
couples, whether or not they were gay. Up to 
that time, those benefits were available only 
to married spouses and their children. The 
2008 change made a "domestic partner" an 
eligible dependent of a state worker, and 
defined domestic partner generally as a 
person living in the same home with a state 
employee who had been living there for at 
least a year, was not married, and was at 
least 18 years old. 
Ten months after "Proposition 120" had 
passed, the Arizona legislature passed a law 
that was to go into effect on January 1 oflast 
year, wiping out coverage for all domestic 
paliners, gay or not. Titled "Section 0," it 
said simply that "dependent" in state benefit 
law meant only a spouse or an eligible child 
(one under age 19 or, if a full-time student, 
under age 23). The state legislature adopted 
Section 0, concluding that coverage of 
domestic patiners was costing the state 
upwards of $4 million a year, and the state 
was faced with a serious budget crisis, with 
a rising deficit. Section ° was one of 40 
provisions that were adopted as cuts to the 
state budget. 
Section 0, however, has never gone into 
effect, because a group of gay and lesbian 
state workers sued to challenge it and, in the 
meantime, got a court order blocking its 
enforcement. 
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Their lawsuit, based on the equal legal 
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, argued that the loss of health 
care for their domestic partners, and for the 
children of their domestic partners, was 
discriminatory. Since state workers who 
were not gay could keep their benefits if 
they got married, while gay workers were 
barred from marrying, the effect was to 
single out gays for the denial of benefits that 
they formerly had enjoyed. The loss, they 
argued, would be a significant financial and 
emotional hardship. One example that 
federal courts cited was of a University of 
Arizona professor who had been in a 
committed relationship for 22 years with her 
partner, who could not work because of a 
need to care for the partner's 89-year-old 
mother. The partner had signed up for 
family health coverage provided by the 
state, needing it for herself because she has 
asthma and could not get private health 
insurance. She would lose that coverage 
under Section O. 
A federal judge ruled that the challengers 
were likely to succeed when their case was 
tried, and blocked Section O. The judge 
found that, while that provision did not end 
coverage only for domestic partners of gays, 
but the partners of all state employees, it 
would have a "discriminatory effect" on 
gays because of the state's marriage ban. A 
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit 
agreed. The state had argued that the 
provision was justified by the need to save 
state funds, a need to reduce the cost of 
running the domestic partner benefit 
program, and a desire to promote marriage 
in its traditional form. The Circuit Court 
panel rejected all of those reasons, 
concluding that none of them could survive 
constitutional challenge, even with the cOUli 
only applying the least-demanding standard: 
rational basis review. State employees and 
their families have no constitutional right to 
benefits, the panel conceded, but it added: 
"When a state chooses to provide such 
benefits, it may not do so in an arbitrary or 
discriminatory manner that adversely affects 
particular groups that may be unpopular." 
When the full 28-judge Circuit Court 
refused to reconsider the case en bane, the 
two dissenting judges argued that there was 
no evidence that the Arizona legislature had 
passed Section 0 in order to discriminate 
against state employees who are gay or 
lesbian, and such an intent would be 
necessary to make the cut-off of benefits 
unconstitutional. "It rests only on budgetary 
considerations," the dissenters contended. 
Further, the dissenters argued, the panel 
decision was based upon the "veiled but 
unmistakable" conclusion that "rules 
benefitting only traditional marriage serve 
no conceivable rational purpose." The 
decision thus set a precedent for striking 
down efforts by states "to promote 
traditional marriage," the dissenting opinion 
asserted. 
Arizona's petltIOn to the Supreme Court 
raises three questions: whether Section 0 is 
unconstitutional though it was written in a 
neutral way and there is no evidence of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
whether the state had justified it adequately 
as eliminating the added expense and 
administrative burden of covering all 
domestic partners, and whether the fact that 
Arizona bars same-sex marriage is a valid 
basis for finding Section 0 to be biased. 
The Ninth Circuit ruling, state officials 
argued, was flawed on the merits, conflicts 
with rulings ofthe Supreme Court on how to 
judge discrimination under the Fomieenth 
Amendment, conflicts with rulings of other 
state courts on similar issues, and ignores 
the state's valid reasons for Section 0-
"conserving state resources and funds and 
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promoting traditional marriage." Indirectly, 
the petition added, picking up on the 
dissenting Circuit Court judges, the panel 
decision has struck down Arizona's state 
laws and constitutional provision limiting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples. 
Noting that the Ninth Circuit had also struck 
down California's "Proposition 8" ban on 
same-sex marriage in that state, the Arizona 
petition said the Ninth Circuit decision in 
the domestic partners case was "in some 
ways even more breathtaking" because the 
"Proposition 8" ruling did not reach the 
question of the constitutionality of same-sex 
marriage, while this decision does, at least 
indirectly. 
The Arizona state employees who filed the 
challenge have 30 days to respond to the 
new petition, unless that time is extended. 
The Supreme Court is not expected to act 
upon the case during its summer recess. 
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"Same-sex Partner Benefits Can't Be Cut Off" 
The San Francisco Chronicle 
September 7,2011 
Bob Egelko 
A state can't selectively withdraw benefits 
from same-sex couples, a federal appeals 
cOUli ruled Tuesday in blocking Arizona's 
attempt to deny health coverage to the 
domestic partners of gay and lesbian state 
employees. 
When a state provides health care to its 
employees, "it may not do so in an arbitrary 
or discriminatory manner that adversely 
affects particular groups that may be 
unpopular," said the Ninth U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals in San Francisco. 
The 3-0 ruling upheld a federal judge's 
injunction against a law that was signed by 
Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer in 2009 and was 
scheduled to take effect this year. Brewer's 
predecessor, Janet Napolitano, had 
authorized health benefits for state 
employees' domestic partners in April 2008 
before leaving to become President Obama's 
Homeland Security secretary. 
Tara Borelli of Lambda Legal, a lawyer for 
nine lesbian and gay state employees in 
Arizona, said the ruling is the first by a 
federal appeals court "to recognize that 
equal pay for equal work means that lesbian 
and gay state employees should get the same 
family health coverage as their heterosexual 
co-workers." 
Matthew Benson, a spokesman for Brewer, 
said the governor is considering a further 
appeal. He said Brewer and Arizona 
lawmakers had "eliminated domestic partner 
benefits across the board for both gay and 
straight couples in response to the state 
budget crisis." 
The court said, however, that the cutoff had 
a discriminatory impact because only 
opposite-sex couples could restore their 
benefits by getting married. The ruling 
provides health coverage only to the 
domestic partners of gay and lesbian 
couples-the sole plaintiffs in the suit-an 
impact that Benson said promotes 
inequality. 
The cOUli also said the plaintiffs presented a 
study showing a cutoff of benefits to same-
sex partners would achieve only minimal 
savings-no more than $1.8 million a year 
for fewer than 300 pminers in a state with a 
$7.8 billion budget, according to court 
documents-and the state had offered no 
rebuttal. 
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